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The threat of factions to republican government has been recognised since at least 370 
B.C.E., when Plato recorded the dialogues which comprise his Republic.1 That threat was 
given extensive consideration in the debate over the ratification of the constitution of the 
United States of America. Federalist 10, authored by James Madison,2 is the most widely 
recognised contribution to that debate. There are numerous other offerings, from both the 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist3 camps, that the proposed constitution would either reduce or 
increase the threat of faction. Now that the American experiment has run for well over 200 
years, we are well positioned to judge the success of their constitutional plan. Given that the 
United States was ravaged by violent faction during the Civil War, clearly the plan has not 
been an unqualified success. Special interest politics may be considered a more benign form 
of factional discord, and more contemporary political theorists, including F. A. Hayek, and, 
more recently, Gordon Tullock, James Buchanan and Roger Congleton have proposed 
innovations to prevent democratic institutions from being employed to advance the interests 
of one faction of the society over those of the remainder. This paper traces the history of 
thought regarding how democratic republics might be protected from what Madison called 
‘the mischief of factions’, from ancient to contemporary times. It suggests that the 
institutional framework that emerged from America’s constitutional convention was less 
resistant to factional discord than Madison’s own “Virginia Plan,” and that some ancient and 
modern constitutional procedures could further reduce the problems of competing factions 
within a republic. 
 
From Madison to Plato and Back 
My point of departure for this exploration of faction will be James Madison’s Federalist 10. 
In placing Madison’s writings in their historical context, however, we should be attentive to 
differing usages of the term faction. David Hume put forth a taxonomy of faction which we 
can apply to this end4. Hume distinguishes between personal, based on personal friendship or 
animosity, and real factions. Real factions can be further subdivided into factions of 
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affection, principle and interest. Real factions of affection refer to attachment to persons or 
families, and may be violent. Real factions of principle are also likely to result in violent 
conflict. These factions are the basis of all religious wars. When Adam Smith writes of 
faction, this form is his primary concern5. Madison was certainly familiar with sectarian 
conflict, having exploited mutual distrust amongst churches in Virginia to defeat a tax 
proposed by Patrick Henry to support teachers of the Christian religion.6 Hume regards real 
faction based on interest as the most reasonable and acceptable, and a necessary consequence 
of the self-interested nature of human beings. The contemporary terminology for a real 
faction of interest would be a special interest group.  
 
The most important distinction is between factions of interest, which are non-violent, and 
operate within political institutions, and all other forms of faction, which may become 
violent, and result in the replacement of existing political institutions. Most early writers are 
primarily concerned with violent factions.7 Although special interest groups (factions of 
interest) are the most benign form of faction, they may still be a legitimate cause for concern. 
The pursuit of their interest is likely to come at the expense of those outside the group, and 
the total benefits received by interest group members may be significantly smaller than the 
total associated costs imposed on others.8 These rent-seeking9 efforts, and the corresponding 
counter-measures by those attempting to defend themselves, or capture the disputed benefits 
for themselves, can constitute a significant social waste of resources.10 The aggregate amount 
expended by all contestants to win a valuable legally restricted privilege11 may be equal to,12 
or even exceed13 the value of the privilege. The resources expended in such contests over 
existing pieces of the economic “pie” are resources that could have otherwise been used to 
create new wealth, and expand the pie.  The problem of rent-seeking factions is not that they 
use the political system to pursue their goals, but that the process is likely to result in net 
social loss rather than net social gain.14 
 
Madison himself defines factions in a manner consistent with both violent factions and rent-
seeking interest groups.  
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority 
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.15 
 
In Federalist 10, Madison goes on to observe; 
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There are two methods of curing the mischiefs [sic] of faction: the one, by 
removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. 
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one by 
destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving every 
citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.16  
 
In his Republic, Plato recognises the threat of a faction forming among the guardian class, on 
whom the citizenry would depend for defense.17 His proposed solution is to remove the cause 
of the faction, by a combination of the two methods described by Madison. To prevent the 
development of interests opposed to the common good, the guardians are to be prohibited 
from having private property of any kind. In fact, even their women and children are to be 
held in common, so that personal attachments may not form that might compete with the 
needs of the republic for the guardians’ loyalty. At least in this instance, Madison’s opinion 
seems correct, that removing the cause of faction through the destruction of liberty is worse 
than the disease, and that the attempt to dictate the opinions, passions and interests of citizens 
is as impractical as the destruction of liberty is unwise.18 
 
Montesquieu the Anti-Federalist vs. Montesquieu the Federalist 
Montesquieu saw inequality as leading to factional discord in a democratic republic. He has a 
prescription to pursue equality, and an associated commonality of opinions, passions and 
interests. 
[F]or the preservation of this equality it is absolutely necessary that there should 
be some regulation in respect to women’s dowries, donations, successions, 
testamentary settlements, and all other forms of contracting. For were it once 
allowed to dispose of our property to whom and how we pleased, the will of each 
individual would disturb the order of the fundamental law.19 
 
Madison also sees a link between property, the inherent heterogeneity of individual abilities, 
and the diversion of interests, but he draws a very different lesson from it. 
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, 
is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of 
these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different 
and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees 
and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the 
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society 
into different interests and parties.20 
 
Madison rejects the prospect of removing the causes of factions, leaving only one option; 
“The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of faction cannot be removed and 
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that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.”21 The proposed 
constitutional plan incorporates two features that advance this purpose. The first is that the 
union is to be a republic rather than a pure democracy. The elected representatives are 
presumed to have greater wisdom that the average individual, and their patriotism and love of 
justice are anticipated to temper temporary or partial considerations.22 The second feature is 
that the greater size of the union, as opposed to the member states, is sure to incorporate a 
much broader array of interests, which, to some degree, can be expected to hold each other in 
check.23 In any case, the greater diversity of interests in the more expansive state should 
provide an obstacle to the coalescence of a single majority, which would impose its will on 
the remaining minority. Madison here is appealing to a transaction costs argument as 
impeding the formation of a dominant coalition. 
The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so 
great a number of interests and parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be 
likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the 
whole or of the minority; and in the 2nd place, that in case they shd [sic] have 
such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it.24 
 
In this, Madison follows Hume, who noted that although it would be more difficult for a 
republic to form over a large rather than a small geographic region, once formed, it should be 
more stable because, “the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by 
intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.”25 
A larger republic should also prevent what Hume termed personal factions, since it is only in 
a small republic that “[e]very domestic quarrel … becomes an affair of state.”26 
 
Madison advances a second reason to believe that a larger republic is less likely than a 
smaller one to succumb to the mischief of factions. In addition to the transactions costs of 
forming a majority coalition of diverse interests, Madison has an argument based on the size 
of the sample from which representatives are drawn.27 There is an optimum size of a 
legislative body, based on the dynamics of deliberation.28 As the size of the polity increases, 
the proportion of the citizenry included in the legislature falls. The assumption is that the 
representatives are drawn from the virtuous tail of the distribution. As Madison writes in 
Federalist 10, “as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the 
large than the small republic” the electoral process “will be more likely to centre in men who 
possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.” This may 
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raise questions as to the robustness of the constitutional plan, which Madison has addressed 
elsewhere, and I will revisit below.  
  
Whereas Madison appeals to the larger size of the union (as opposed to the states) as a bar to 
factions, the Anti-Federalists argued that the opposite result should be expected. Factions 
should be less of a threat at the state level because the smaller size of the states, relative to the 
union, would lead to a greater commonality of interests among the citizens.29 What is a 
common interest to the citizens of one state, however, may be contrary to the interests of 
other states, or the nation as a whole. Madison was well aware of the propensity of the states, 
under the Articles of Confederation, to pass legislation harmful to each other.30 To his 
thinking, the likelihood of common interest within a state is a potential source of faction, not 
a solution to it. 
 
In the debate on whether the larger size of the union, as opposed to the states, prevents or 
promotes factional intrigue, Montesquieu is pressed into service on both sides of the issue. 
The Anti-Federalists frequently quote the following passage. 
It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long 
subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of 
less moderation; there are too great deposites to intrust [sic] into the hands of a 
single subject; interests are divided; an ambitious person soon becomes sensible 
that he may be happy, great, and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and 
that he might raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. 
 
In a large republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is 
subordinate to exceptions; and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest 
of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of 
every citizen; abuses have a lesser extent, and of course are less protected.31  
 
Montesquieu saw the size of a state as dictating the proper form of government, so that it is 
“…the natural property of small states to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be 
subject to a monarch, and of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince…”32 He did, 
however, hold out hope that an institutional innovation would permit the geographic 
extension of the republican ideal. The following passage, especially relevant to the ongoing 
constitutional debate, gave the Federalists an answer to the Anti-Federalist argument given 
above.33 
If a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force, if it be large, it is ruined 
by an internal imperfection. 
 
Controlling the Mischief of Factions – Alan Lockard 
 8
This twofold inconveniency is equally contagious to democracies and 
aristocracies, whether good or bad. The evil is in the very thing itself; and no 
form can address it. 
 
Very probable it is therefore that mankind would have been at length obliged to 
live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a 
kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together 
with the external force of a monarchial, government. I mean a confederate 
republic.34  
 
Long before Montesquieu’s contribution on the dangers of concentrations of wealth to 
republics, Aristotle had considered the issue. Aristotle saw economic inequality as both an 
unavoidable characteristic of the human condition, and a source of faction. He has a regard 
for those in the middle of the income distribution that we will see revisited by the Anti-
Federalists. 
Now in all states there are three elements: one class is very rich, another very 
poor, and a third in a mean. It is admitted that moderation and the mean are best, 
and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation; 
for in that condition of life men are most ready to follow rational principle.35 
 
Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by the citizens of 
the middle class, and those states are likely to be well-administered, in which the 
middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes, or at any 
rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns back the scale, 
and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant.36 
 
The mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other is free from faction; and 
where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and 
dissensions. For a similar reason large states are less liable to faction than small 
ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy 
to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave 
nothing in the middle.37 
 
In a large state, a higher proportion of the population may be comprised of the middle class. 
In a republic, however, it is a sample, and not the population as a whole, which rules. In the 
next section, I will examine both Federalist and Anti-Federalist concerns with drawing a 
legislative sample from the relevant population.  
 
 
The Robustness of the Plan and the Median Yeoman 
Rousseau had an outlook regarding the nature of man, and its implication for government. 
“Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So a perfect 
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government is not for men.”38 Madison also recognised the problem, but is less fatalistic 
about it. 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.39 
 
The challenge then is to devise governing institutions that are robust against the inherent 
weaknesses of mankind. Representative government offers a solution to this problem, 
through the device of selecting the proper sample of the population to form the legislative 
body. There are serious problems here, however. To the degree that citizens are good and 
wise, we want the sample to accurately reflect the population. But when the population is bad 
and unwise, we want our sample to be biased toward the virtuous. Furthermore, public 
preferences may not be exogenous. Various forces may contribute to shaping the public will, 
including the deliberative process by which democracy operates.40 Rousseau sees the rise of 
factions as the primary impediment to the aggregation of individual preferences into a 
statistically robust reflection of the inherently virtuous general will. His insight merits 
quoting at length. 
It follows from what has gone before that the general will is always right and 
tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the 
people are always equally correct. Our will is always for our own good, but we do 
not always see what that is; the people is never corrupted [sic], but it is often 
deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad. 
 
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general 
will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private 
interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills; but take away 
from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the 
general will remains as the sum of the differences. 
 
If, when the people, being furnished with adequate information, held its 
deliberations, the citizens had no communication one with another, the grand total 
of the small differences would always be the general will, and the decision would 
always be good. But when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at 
the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations 
becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation 
to the state: it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are 
men, but only as many as there are associations. The differences become less 
numerous and give a less general result. Lastly, when one of these associations is 
so great as to prevail there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which 
prevails is purely particular.41 
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Using Rousseau’s terms, we see that the will of all can be shaped contrary to the general 
will.42 Adam Smith regards the self-interested preaching of the clergy as a threat in this 
regard.43 Aristotle saw demagogues railing against the rich as the primary threat.44 
 
As we have seen, the size of the polity was a critical issue in the Federalist/Anti-Federalist 
debate. Arguments were made on both sides regarding how the size of states either aids or 
hinders beneficial selection of representatives. Madison argues that increasing the size of the 
polity will increase the quality of the legislature. He believes that political institutions can be 
designed to lead to the selection of the best and the brightest - individuals who place the 
general good before sectarian interests. He is not sanguine on this point, noting, as he does in 
Federalist 10, “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” He does, however, 
argue in “Vices of the Political System of the United States:” 
An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a 
process of elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the society the 
purest and most noble characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most 
strongly the proper motives to pursue the end of their appointment, and be most 
capable to devise the proper means of attaining it.45 
 
Madison argues in Federalist 10 that enlarging the sphere from which representatives are 
drawn will increase the quality of representatives. As he says, “as each representative will be 
chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more 
difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success vicious arts by which elections are 
too often carried.” The Anti-Federalists came to the opposite conclusion, since in a large 
republic constituents would be less likely to know candidates personally: 
To provide for the people’s wandering throughout the state for a representative, 
may sometimes enable them to elect a more brilliant or an abler man, than by 
confining them to districts, but generally this latitude will be used to pernicious 
purposes, especially connected with the choice by plurality; when a man in the 
remote part of the state, perhaps obnoxious at home, but ambitious and intriguing, 
may be chosen to represent the people in another part of the state far distant, and 
by a small part of them, or by a faction, or by a combination of some particular 
description of men among them.46 
 
Rather than fix their hopes on a fortuitous selection from a large sample, the Anti-Federalists 
looked to keeping republican states small. This increases the likelihood that legislators would 
not only represent their constituencies in the political sense, but be representative of them as 
well, rather than being drawn from some elite subset. The Anti-Federalists apparently 
subscribed to a median yeoman model of democracy. Sydney, writing to the citizens of the 
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State of New York, notes there is general agreement that, “the rights and liberties of a country 
were ever in danger from the rich and poor, and their safety in the middle sort or yeomanry of 
the country…”47 The general interest would be best served by protecting the interest of this 
median yeoman, rather than giving sway to the interests in the tails of the social distribution. 
And the best way to see that the interests of the yeoman were represented was to allow him to 
be a representative. This is more likely when the political sample, from which legislators are 
drawn, is smaller. 
 
The Federalists believed the constitutional plan would be sufficient to secure the nation 
against the mischief of factions. Although the historical record was littered with instances 
where the liberties of the people were lost to factional discord,48 the science of political 
economy had advanced since earlier times. Lessons had been learned to good effect. 
Hamilton observes; 
The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not 
known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of 
power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and 
checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during 
good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of 
their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principle 
progress towards perfection in modern times.49 
 
Madison’s Vision versus the Constitution 
Although Madison had a profound influence on the development of the United States 
Constitution, the final form of that constitution differed significantly from the ideal that 
Madison envisioned. Madison’s blueprint was detailed in the Virginia Plan50 that Madison 
brought with him to the constitutional convention. The Virginia Plan provided that both 
houses of Congress would be apportioned by population, with the members of the second 
house elected by the members of the first. The national government would also have veto 
power over the acts of the various state legislators. Madison was concerned about the tyranny 
of the majority at the state level, expressed through their legislatures. As he wrote to 
Jefferson, explaining why he favored a national veto over state law, “The mutability of the 
laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and 
flagrant as to alarm the most stedfast [sic] friends of Republicanism.”51 In was in the interests 
of the various states against each other, or the nation as a whole, that Madison saw the threat 
of factional discord. He believed that under a government organised as outlined in the 
Virginia Plan, competition between factions would check the harm that factions could do. 
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When key provisions of his plan were rejected by the Constitutional Convention, Madison 
feared the new nation would be unable to withstand the factional discord that concerned him. 
The factional competition he looked to in Federalist 10 to control competing interests was no 
longer sufficient, given the enlarged influence of the various states in selecting Senators, and 
the lack of a national veto of state laws. The checks and balances discussed in Federalist 51 
would now be required to defend against factional discord.52  In arguing for provisions of the 
Virginia Plan at the Constitutional Convention, Madison voiced concerns that the constitution 
as drafted by the convention might not be adequate to restrain conflict between Northern and 
Southern interests.53 Madison’s continued support of the Constitution, writing as Publius, 
likely reflects not unqualified support, but recognition that the proposed constitution, for all 
its shortcomings, was the best realistically achievable improvement over the clearly 
unsatisfactory Articles of Confederation.54 Madison’s concerns that the Constitution, as 
adopted, might be inadequate to constrain factional violence proved well founded, given that 
the divergence between the interests of the Northern and Southern states resulted in open 
warfare less than a century later. We can only speculate, however, whether Madison’s plan, 
had it been implemented as he proposed it, would have been able to prevent that tragedy. 
 
In evaluating Madison’s vision we might consider if it should be regarded as consistent with 
Public Choice philosophy.55 The Public Choice perspective simply extends the assumptions 
that economists have long used in the analysis of markets to the analysis of political 
institutions. That is, persons are assumed to be self-interested, and to attempt to achieve their 
objectives at minimum personal cost. The idea that self-interest threatens political 
institutions’ ability to promote the common good is pervasive in Madison’s writing. His 
concern about the threat of factions is just one example of his awareness of the problem. It is 
important to note, however, that Madison’s political vision is based on more than just 
pessimistic concerns about self-interested agents in the political sphere. He also envisions a 
system in which “the purest and noblest characters… as will at once feel most strongly the 
proper motives to pursue the end of their appointment” will “be most capable to devise the 
proper means of attaining it.”56 Madison envisioned a system that would grant to those who 
acted in the public interest the power to achieve their ends, while simultaneously thwarting 
those would pursue individual or factional interest. Madison would certainly not feel at home 
with those Public Choice theorists whose analysis is based solely on narrow self-interest.57 
However, he might well feel comfortable with those who regard institutions designed to 
constrain self-interest as essential complements to virtue in the political realm.58 
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Modern Innovations: Hayek, Tullock, Buchanan and Congleton 
Hamilton, writing in Federalist 9, indicated that the constitutional plan should be expected to 
succeed, where previous republics had failed, because of the more advanced state of the 
science of politics.59 That science has advanced further yet, since the Constitution was 
ratified, and political theorists are still making proposals to address the concerns which 
animated the debate over the constitution.  
 
The susceptibility to special interest factions is an inherent deficiency of democracy. The 
political apparatus is exploited to discriminate against one subset of the populace for the 
benefit of another. Political theorists have sought to rectify this failure by constraining the 
ability of democratic institutions to discriminate. Buchanan and Tullock have argued that 
total social costs (decision making costs and the costs imposed by majorities on minorities) 
can be minimised by the proper selection of a supermajority requirement on any cost-
imposing legislation.60 Clearly, if unanimous agreement were required, minority interests 
would be completely secure from special interest factions, or coalitions thereof.61 As the 
voting rule approaches unanimity, however, strategic voting (holding out for a larger share of 
the potential gains) becomes problematic, and the costs of reaching a decision rise sharply.62 
 
An alternative solution may be found in the principle of Generality. Friedrich A. Hayek has 
proposed a reorganization of bicameral legislatures to achieve this end. The lower house 
would have responsibility for the administration of the government, while the upper house 
would have exclusive control over generation of the enforceable rules of just conduct.63 The 
conduct of the affairs of government, assigned to the lower house, necessarily affects some 
parties differently than others, as when a contract is awarded to one bidder as opposed to 
another. Those activities, however, must not violate the general rules laid out by the upper 
house, which must always be constructed such that, at the time of passage, it cannot be 
determined how any individual would be affected. The arrangement seems a plausible 
impediment to special interest factions. Given the potential gains from special interest 
legislation at the national level, however, it seems premature to assume the innovation would 
politically achievable. 
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A less detailed program for generality in democracy is proposed by James Buchanan and 
Roger Congleton.64 Their argument is for a simple constitutional constraint requiring all 
legislation to apply to all citizens equally. They point out that this would effectively block 
most special interest redistribution, while permitting properly constructed public initiatives. 
The idea can be illustrated through their proposal for nondiscriminatory income maintenance. 
Rather than the traditional redistribution from high income to low income individuals, or 
discriminatory graduated taxations, similar outcomes could be achieved by a combination of 
flat taxes and demogrants.65 All citizens would have their incomes taxed at the same rate, 
regardless of income, and each citizen would receive a grant from the government, also 
regardless of income. The result would be an effective redistribution from high-income 
citizens to those with low income, but every citizen would be treated identically as a matter 
of law.  
 
An Ancient Innovation: The Lot 
Choice by lot has been known at least since the time of Homer.66 Plato, Isocrates, 
Demosthenes, Xenophon and Aristotle refer to the use of lots in democracies.67 In Athens, in 
the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., virtually all administrative positions (excluding a few 
requiring specialised abilities, such as military leaders) were filled by lot.68 Positions chosen 
by lot also included Priests, Priestesses69 and jurors.70 The use of the lot was considered, in 
part to reflect the will of the gods.71 The democratic nature of election by lot was more 
important than its religious implications, however.72 Aristotle goes so far as to say, “[T]he 
appointments of magistrates by lot is thought to be democratical, and the election of them 
oligarchical.”73 The Athenians considered selection by lot as essential to democracy.74 Any 
other known method of election would be inherently susceptible to manipulation by 
organised interest, and prevent rule by the demos.75 Greek critics of the lot (including 
Socrates) were also critics of democracy, generally, and criticised the lot because it was 
regarded as democratic.76 As Headlam notes, 
On this point there can be no doubt: election by lot was regarded by those who 
had experience of it as essentially democratic: if this is the case we may add, it 
was democratic. It would require some very strong proofs to justify us in putting 
aside the almost unanimous verdict of the Greeks themselves on a point on which 
they had complete experience and of which we have no knowledge except what 
we gain from them.77 
 
The Greeks recognised decision by lot as a defense against faction;78 “In democratic states 
legislation ought to provide for appointment by lot to the less important and the majority of 
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the offices (for thus faction will be avoided)…”79 Of Athenian democracy, utilizing the lot, 
Headlam notes, 
So far as we can see the administration of the state was more regular, more 
honest, more successful in every way than that of any other city in the ancient 
world, and (though where the work is so different, the comparison is hardly fair) 
than that of most states in modern time.80 
 
During the Renaissance, both Florence and Venice employed the lot in the selection of public 
officials. The Venetian system of government was so highly regarded that it gave rise to what 
has become known as the “Myth of Venice.”81 Liberty, stability, peace and justice were 
regarded as the characteristics of the city-state. Venetian politics were considered free of self-
interest, ambition, intrigue, corruption or faction.82 The claims are clearly exaggerated,83 but 
relative to other municipalities, Venice performed well from its founding in 421 until 
Napoleon compelled the ruling council to dissolve itself in 1797.  
 
During that period, Venice experienced no violent changes of power. It had a stable 
constitution for roughly 1000 years, beginning about 800.84 Its electoral procedures were 
acknowledged to be designed to curtail factional discord.85 Hume cites the example of Venice 
when making proposals to constrain factional discord.86 In addition to complex election 
procedures incorporating lotteries,87 the conduct of politics as we would recognise it was 
forbidden. Citizens could not ask to be elected as a nominator, or have another ask on their 
behalf. Virtually all social gatherings where political alliances might be advanced were 
regulated or prohibited, including large dinners, weddings and baptisms.88 The theory behind 
these prohibitions may be consistent with that expressed by Rousseau, discussed earlier in 
this paper. Political discourse amongst inherently self-interested individuals would tend to 
bias the collective decision process in a manner that would lead it away from the general will. 
 
Enforcement of the Venetian system was not without its problems. That these laws were 
often violated is seen in the numerous revisions to increase penalties, or to prohibit 
innovations designed to evade them. In addition, outright cheating in the lottery process was 
fairly common. The process involved drawing gold or silver balls from an urn. Patricians 
were known to bring balls with them, and pretend to draw them at random, or to make more 
than one pass by the urn if they were dissatisfied with their draw.89  In addition to procedural 
irregularities in the process of drawing lots, the prohibitions on political discourse were often 
circumvented. Whether it was in spite of these violations, or because of them,90 Venice was 
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relatively free of factional violence.  As an anonymous eighteenth century observer noted, 
“Here they fight not with blood but with ballots.”91  
 
Florence employed lotteries more broadly than Venice and, as a result, was regarded as more 
democratic.92 Election by lot was considered coincident with liberty and equality.93 After the 
deaths of two oppressive leaders (Castruccio Castracani and Charles of Calabria) in 1328, 
selection of public officials by lot was adopted in Florence. These deaths provided the 
Florentines with an opportunity to “take counsel and deliberate on how they might provide 
the city with leadership and a government in way that would gain general approval and 
eliminate the factions among citizens.”94 With some modifications and brief interruptions, the 
electoral scheme developed, with elective offices filled through lottery. It lasted for the next 
150 years. The lottery process was abandoned in 1478, in conjunction with the Pazzi 
conspiracy, ending the golden age of Florentine republicanism.95 
 
Rousseau had argued that, in the absence of factions, the general will would be the mean of 
the distribution of the individual wills. That is, “take away from these same wills the pluses 
and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the 
differences.”96 As Levy observes, “When voting on a single dimension issue, single-peaked 
voting preferences of any sort generate stable majority rule.”97 Under those circumstances, 
the preferences of the median voter98 will correspond to the general will, and be selected 
under a majority voting rule. As we have seen, however, Rousseau believed factions can 
cause the distribution of preferences to clump into as many peaks as there are factions. Levy 
notes the significance of this as an explanation why the use of the lot might impede violent 
faction.99 
The nice properties of the sample median, in particular its convergence to the 
general will with the expenditure of labor resources, depend upon factions not 
being terribly strong. With factionalism, the actual results will swing wildly. This 
large influence of a single vote is a remarkably promising method of explaining 
political violence.100 
 
Since the outcome of a close election can be altered by the removal of a few critical voters, 
the incentive to do so may be enormous, depending on what is at stake. Levy goes on to point 
out that Madison’s intuition regarding the number of factions is correct. The marginal benefit 
of eliminating a voter falls as we move from two large factions to many small factions. Thus 
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the diversity of interests in a large state may deter factional violence, so long as small 
factions cannot overcome the transactions costs of forming large coalitions.  
 
Levy explains how the use of the lot might deter violent factions. Gordon Tullock, on the 
other hand, examines rent-seeking factions. He shows how a randomisation of democratic 
selection processes can address the factional aspects of special interest groups. In his seminal 
article, “Efficient rent-seeking,”101 he develops a model for evaluating the dissipation of rents 
in a rent-seeking contest, and the level of effort that can be expected by the various interests 
(factions) engaged in the contest. Tullock’s model is probabilistic, in that increases in efforts 
to win the prize (rent) increase the likelihood of success. What is relevant to the discussion 
here is that in Tullock’s model, rent-seeking activities can be reduced by erecting institutions 
which exhibit decreasing returns to those activities. Gradstein and Konrad, writing on the 
implication of Tullock’s model spell it out for us. “Our results indicate that the optimal 
contest structure hinges on how discriminatory the contest is – that is, on the relative 
importance of contestants’ efforts to win the prize versus random factors.”102 That is, 
introducing an element of randomness into democratic processes, by the use of the lot, for 




Men are not angels, nor are they ruled by angels. In a democracy, they rule themselves. The 
Federalists constructed a constitutional plan that was robust to a particular kind of sampling 
problem, the selection of public officials. A variety of checks and balances were erected by 
which the self-interests of public officials were brought into alignment with the public 
interest. In jealously guarding their own prerogatives, they were guided to check the 
ambitions of agents in the other branches of government. It was not necessary to hope that 
only the most virtuous and public-spirited citizens would seek public office. The institutions 
could withstand some of the kind of adverse selection we should expect when political power 
is made available to those who seek it. 
 
Democracies face another danger, and more intractable - the threat of majority factions. This 
is not a sampling problem. The median yeoman, in the population as a whole, may well be a 
member of a faction or coalition that is willing to advance its interests at the expense of the 
rights of the minority. In seeking institutions that will protect minority interests against the 
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tyranny of the majority,103 we are pursuing a different kind of robustness. The challenge is to 
construct constitutional restraints that, in a sense, protect the population from their own will, 
as revealed through the democratic process. Madison believed that the breadth of the union 
would make it unlikely for majority coalitions of diverse interests to form; the transaction 
costs would be too high.  
 
Some 220 years ago, a constitutional moment presented itself to the American confederation. 
The founders did the best they could, given the state of political science at the time. Although 
the United States Constitution is in many ways an extraordinarily successful document, it was 
not a complete success in restraining factional discord, as was revealed in the United States 
Civil War. Perhaps a political process that incorporated an element of randomness, as was 
used in ancient Athens and renaissance Florence and Venice might have prevented that 
outcome. It is unlikely that contemporary democracies, even in the 18th century would have 
accepted selection of representatives by lottery, however. It is also possible that a 
constitutional constraint that would restrict legislatures to passing general legislation would 
have prevented factions from threatening each other’s interests though the political process. 
That claim must remain speculative at best, however. More likely, Madison’s vision of a 
strong national government with the ability to withstand and subdue regional interests would 
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